Dynamic Adaptive Policymaking for implementing Mobility as a Service (MAAS) by Jittrapirom, P. et al.
PDF hosted at the Radboud Repository of the Radboud University
Nijmegen
 
 
 
 
The following full text is a publisher's version.
 
 
For additional information about this publication click this link.
http://hdl.handle.net/2066/179332
 
 
 
Please be advised that this information was generated on 2017-12-15 and may be subject to
change.
 
 
© AET 2017 and contributors 
1 
DYNAMIC ADAPTIVE POLICYMAKING FOR IMPLEMENTING MOBILITY 
AS A SERVICE (MAAS) 
 
Peraphan Jittrapirom  
Vincent A.W.J. Marchau 
Henk Meurs 
Radboud University, Nijmegen School of Management, 
Nijmegen, the Netherlands 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Given the global urbanisation, many cities around the world are currently 
facing challenges in managing their transport system. Citizens of cities suffer 
from its negative externalities, such as poor air quality, extended travel time, 
and congested road spaces (Edwards & Smith, 2008; Hayashi, et al. 2004; 
Taipale, et al. 2012; Zavitsas, et al. 2010). Recent trends in reduced car-
ownership, the rise of sharing economy, and an introduction of digitalisation 
into transport sector provide an opportunity to improve the urban transport 
system and address its adverse effects (CIVITAS, 2016; Holmberg et al., 
2015). In this paper, we focus on a specific innovative transport concept: 
Mobility-as-a-Service (MaaS). MaaS combines different transport modes to 
offer a hyper-convenient and tailored-made transport solution for its user.  
MaaS is a concept, formally initiated within the information technology sector. 
It denotes an ability to set up a large scale information system through a 
virtual network, evading the necessity to invest in capital-intensive 
infrastructure, while enabling users to customise network parameters to their 
needs (Baliga et al., 2011). In the field of transportation, the concept implies a 
different meaning. Hietanen (2014) is one of the first to provide a 
comprehensive definition of MaaS in a transportation context. He describes 
MaaS as a transport distribution model that combines a range of transport 
modes and services to provide a user-orientated transport solution via a single 
interface, in exchange for a pay-as-you-go fee or a monthly subscription, 
similar to a mobile phone service. 
MaaS presents a potential paradigm shift in the transport system. It offers a 
change from the current ownership-based transport system towards a 
consumption based one (Holmberg et al., 2015). It liberates the users from 
any potential mode-specified sunk costs, such as car ownership or annual 
public transport subscription fees, that potentially ‘lock’ users to certain 
modes. Instead, under MaaS users can flexibly combine the available modes 
to fit their changing needs best, through a digital platform, a virtual 
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marketplace that mediates mobility supply and demand (Meurs & 
Timmermans, 2016). Also, MaaS is different to the other transport concepts, 
such as integrated transport or multimodal mobility in its emphasis on the use 
of digitalisation and the ‘business dimension’ or opportunity to connect 
transport service with services from other sectors, such as tourism and 
entertainment. (Finger et al., 2015). 
As MaaS is still in its developing phase, a number of organisations are 
competing to offer different interpretations and supplements to the concept. 
For example, MaaS Alliance, a public-private partnership founded to provide a 
standard approach to MaaS, describes MaaS as an integration of transport 
services to provide on-demand transport through a single mobility platform 
(MaaS Alliance, 2017). The Mobility as a Service for Linking Europe 
(MAASiFiE), a pan-European MaaS project, adds to the above concept by 
emphasising the importance of environmental aspect and shared mobility 
(Karlsson, Sochor, Aapaoja, Eckhardt, & König, 2017). Others sources build 
on these concepts by inserting elements such as personalisation (ATKINS, 
2015), technology (Nemtanu, Schlingensiepen, Buretea, & Iordache 2016), or 
Big Data (Xerox, 2015) as additional aspects of MaaS. (See Jittrapirom et 
al.(2017) for a review on definition of MaaS). In addition to these definitions, 
several actors have also presented their White Papers on MaaS, such as 
Comtrade (2017), travelspirit (2017), and TSSG (2017). If the concept of 
MaaS attracts further interest, its definition will continue to evolve. 
The implementation of MaaS is likely to have positive and negative, uncertain 
effects. Proponents believe that the shift away from an ownership-based to a 
use-based transport system in MaaS has a potential to increase public 
transport use through a provision of a high-level of convenience that 
persuades drivers to give up their private vehicles. Additionally, it can 
contribute to the transport system performance by increasing its efficiency, 
reducing congestion, decreasing the need for parking space, and enhancing 
the level of accessibility (European Comission, 2016). It also provides an 
opportunity to offer a guaranteed door-to-door multimodal transport service, 
which promises customers a trip from A-to-B within a specified time frame. 
Such a system is likely to blur the boundary between public and private 
(Finger et al., 2015). However, there are also several concerns regarding the 
implementation of MaaS. Such as the inherent risks in the increased use of 
centralised, ICT-based transport services, which enable parties that have 
access to the data and how it is presented to users to influence the market, 
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affecting security risks and privacy (Finger et al., 2015). Mulley (2017) points 
out that such tailored mobility solutions can even lead to “more vehicles on the 
road” unless a sharing culture is promoted. Additionally, a trial project in 
Ubigo, a transport broker service in Gothenburg (Sweden), suggests a need 
to regulate how a platform aggregator ‘organise’ users’ trips. The results show 
the trial reduced the participant's’ car use, a desirable societal goal, but this 
also lowered the revenue of the platform owner. For the reason that Ubigo 
was unable to price public transport trip higher than the market rate. Thus it 
relied on making profits from the utilisation of other modes in the package, 
such as taxi, bicycle sharing, car sharing, and car rent (Sochor et al., 2015). 
There is also a concern regarding equity in access to mobility that can be 
influenced by a platform aggregator (P Jittrapirom et al., 2017). For example, 
Whim employs a concept of mobility currency that gives discounted 
advantage to users, who can afford higher monthly package. A mobility point 
purchase through Whim’s most expensive subscription (€389 for 10,000 
points) is more than 50% cheaper than a Whim point purchase through its 
most basic package (€89 for 1,000 points). Lastly, literature such as 
Giesecke, Surakka, & Hakonen, (2016) and Holmberg et al., (2015) 
emphasise the importance of configuring MaaS in a way that ensures its 
contribution towards the overall sustainability of the transport system.  
There have been some MaaS schemes implemented around the world. 
Among those, are pilot projects that operated within a defined period such as 
Ubigo (Finland), SMILE project (Austria), and Katsuplus (Finland). Others are 
ongoing operational schemes, such as Tuup and Whim (Finland), Hannover 
Mobility Shop (Germany), and MyCicero (Italy). The operationalised of these 
pilot and schemes have facilitated a quantification of their impacts. However, 
there still are a limited number of these projects. For this reasons, there are 
still several unknown elements that may restrict MaaS widen implementation, 
such as the preferences of public transport operators, travellers’ acceptance, 
liability in case of malfunctioning, concerns about privacy and security, and 
the contributions of MaaS towards the transport system as a whole. 
To cope with these uncertainties and to enhance the likelihood of success of 
future MaaS projects, we put forward an adaptive approach to implementing 
MaaS system for an urban area of Nijmegen, the Netherlands. The approach 
allows policymakers to create policies that are more robust for future 
situations and can adapt as the future unfolds and uncertainties resolve. The 
application of DAP to this case study should demonstrate its implementation 
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within transport policy making, in particular, implementation of MaaS. In 
section 2, we present a framework for policy analysis and provide a 
classification of uncertainty associated with each entity in the framework. We 
then describe the DAP framework that supports decision makers in dealing 
with high level of uncertainty in section 3. We apply the framework to our case 
study in section 4 and conclude the paper in section 5. 
2. A FRAMEWORK FOR POLICY ANALYSIS AND UNCERTAINTY  
Policymaking, in essence, involves identifying a set of measures or 
interventions to a system, with an aim to gain desirable outcomes.  In Figure 1 
a framework for policymaking based on this view is presented (Walker, 2000). 
The core of this framework is the system domain (R), which in our case, is the 
urban passenger transport system. We can define the boundaries and 
structure within the system domain as follows: the main entities are the 
subjects of transportation (people), the means of transportation (vehicles), and 
related infrastructures (roads, rail within an urban environment). Their mutual 
interactions produce outcomes of interest (O), which in this case can be 
energy consumption, the level of emissions, the level of congestion, and the 
level of traffic safety (e.g. casualties, injuries). Policymakers value these 
outcomes based on their subjective preferences or weighing (W). 
Subsequently, they evaluate these outcomes against their set goals or 
whether the perceived problems are resolved.  
Policies (P) and external forces (X) are two types of influence that act on the 
system domain. The policies are a set of actions policymakers control, such 
as the providing legislation for public transport operations or constructing 
additional bicycle lanes. In contrary, the external forces are beyond the reach 
of policymakers. Examples of such external forces in the field of urban 
transport are population demographics, climate change, technological 
developments, and economic developments.  
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Figure 1. A Policy making framework (Walker, 2000) 
In this framework, different levels of uncertainty can be distinguished per 
location (Walker & Marchau, 2017). For example, regarding external forces 
(X), the uncertainty in national economic developments (X) is considered very 
uncertain while ageing developments might be regarded as rather certain. 
Another example involves the impacts of policies (R). For some policies, the 
impacts can be rather well predicted (e.g. alternative parking fee schemes) 
while for other parking policies (e.g. Park and Ride) this seems more difficult. 
Walker et al., (2010) introduce a typology for uncertainty based on the levels 
of uncertainty. The levels of uncertainty proposed are grounded on a view that 
uncertainty is nonbinary. Additionally, it purports how the level of uncertainty 
can be classified based on how it can quantify or predicted accurately 
(Courtney, 2001). For instance, an entity with uncertainty on level 1 can be 
predicted from trend extrapolation. Level 1 uncertainty is often treated through 
a simple sensitivity analysis of transport model parameters, where the impacts 
of small perturbations of model input parameters on the outcomes of a model 
are assessed.  
Level 2 uncertainty is any uncertainty that can be described adequately in 
statistical terms. In the case of uncertainty about the future, Level 2 
uncertainty is often captured in the form of either a (single) forecast (usually 
trend based) with a confidence interval or multiple forecasts (‘scenarios’) with 
associated probabilities.  
However, in level 3 and 4, it becomes difficult to predict the future using a 
probabilistic approach as there are a multiplicity of plausible (level 3) or even 
unknown (level 4) futures. Figure 2 depicts the gradual transition of a level of 
uncertainty from complete certainty (left) to total ignorance (right).  
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In case of MaaS, the level of uncertainty surrounding its implementation is 
high (Level 4). There are several for this. Firstly, there is still a limited 
knowledge about this novelty transport concept as a transport policy 
intervention. Several of these ambiguities have been mentioned earlier, such 
as the continuous evolving of the definition, its overall effects to the urban 
transport system, and user and stakeholders’ acceptance. It may be possible 
to speculate likely outcomes of these concerns from lessons learnt in other 
sectors, such as hospitality in Airbnb or within the transport sector itself from 
Uber. Still, the speculation is likely to have a limited level of accuracy as well 
as polarised opinions from stakeholders and scientific community. The second 
dimension is the complexity arises from the domain of MaaS. Urban transport 
is known to be a highly complexed system, mainly due to the interconnectivity 
between the entities within it (Kölbl et al., 2008; May, 2003). Certain transport 
policy can bring about unintended effects that worsen the overall performance 
of the system (ADB, 2009; IET, 2010; Jittrapirom, Knoflacher, & Mailer, 2017). 
The third dimension is the valuation of the outcome by decision makers, which 
may be forecasted with some certainty but this subjectivity can also be 
influenced by other factors that have a high level of uncertainty, such as public 
mood at the time of valuation. The final dimension arises from the uncertainty 
associated with the external forces. Certain forces, such as population can be 
forecasted using past data with some accuracy, other forces, such as national 
economic development, are harder to predict accurately. 
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Figure 2: The progressive transition of levels of uncertainty from complete certainty to total 
ignorance (based on (Walker, Marchau, & Kwakkel, 2013)). 
3. DYNAMIC ADAPTIVE POLICY (DAP) 
The key idea to cope with Level 4 uncertainties, is to move away from 
developing a static plan that will work well for one or more specific futures, 
and in its place, constructs a dynamic plan that is flexible, adaptable and 
perform well across the full range of plausible futures (including surprises). 
Based on this awareness, Walker et al. (2001) developed a Dynamic Adaptive 
Policymaking (DAP) scheme which was further elaborated and applied by 
Kwakkel et al. (2010) and Vander Pas et al. (2013).  This scheme enables 
policymakers to deal with the uncertainties surrounding the policy formulation 
process. DAP is based on the recognition that perfect information about a 
system is unattainable. Instead, it focuses on utilising available information in 
making a robust policy that is prepared to cope with uncertain vulnerabilities 
and can capture arising benefits. Moreover, it emphasises the importance of 
creating a policy framework that allows policy to be adapted and changes in 
according to information gain and related feedbacks receive from the system 
as part of the process.   
 
 
© AET 2017 and contributors 
8 
The DAP consists of two phases; 1) a design phase and 2) an implementation 
phase. In the first phase, the dynamic adaptive policy, monitoring program, 
and various pre- and post-implementation actions are formulated. The latter 
phase consists of the operationalising of the policy, the monitoring of its 
performance, and the implementation of (ex-ante developed) adaptation 
actions if necessary. The key terms of DAP are Vulnerabilities, events that 
can reduce the impact of a policy to a point where the policy is no longer 
successful, and Opportunities, events that can enhance or accelerate policy 
success. 
The planning phase of DAP consists of five steps; the first and second steps 
are the identical to the traditional policy formulation, while the rest of the steps 
are unique to DAP. Figure 3 depicts the five steps with a summarised 
description below.  
 Step I: Stage-setting step – this involves the traditional starting 
activities in policymaking, such as specifying objectives or policy goals, 
a definition of success, constraints that may prevent the objectives to 
be reached, and available policy options. 
 Step II: Assembling a basic policy – this consists of selecting a 
preferred, initial policy to be implemented and identifying the required 
conditions for the basic policy to be a success 
 Step III: Increasing the robustness of the basic policy – this involves 
identifying vulnerabilities and opportunities of the selected policy, 
together with their associated likelihood (i.e. certain or uncertain) and 
immediate actions to be implemented in conjunction with the basic 
policy at t = 0 to decrease unfavourable or amplify favourable effects. 
These actions can be classified as:  
o Mitigating Action (M)– actions to reduce a Certain Vulnerability  
o Hedging Action (H) – actions to reduce an Uncertain 
Vulnerability   
o Seizing Actions (SZ) – actions to amplify a Certain Opportunity  
o Exploiting Action (Ez) – actions to amplify an Uncertain 
Opportunity  
o Shaping Action (SH) - actions to reduce the likelihood of a 
vulnerability or an opportunity  
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 Step IV: Setting up the monitoring system. This step includes defining 
signposts to track information and associated triggers. Triggers are 
critical values of signpost variables beyond which actions to change the 
policy should be implemented to ensure that the resulting policy keeps 
moving the system in the right direction and at a proper speed. 
 Step V: Preparing the trigger response – this comprises the 
specification of a set of actions to be taken when a trigger level is 
reached after the basic policy is implemented (at t > 0). The associated 
responsive actions are:  
o Defensive Action (DA) – an action taken after the fact to clarify 
the policy, preserve its benefits, or meet challenges in response 
to specific triggers that leave the basic policy remains 
unchanged 
o Corrective Action (CA) – an adjustment to the basic policy in 
response to specific triggers 
o Capitalizing Action (CP) – an action taken after the fact to take 
advantage of opportunities that further improve the performance 
of the basic policy 
o Reassessment (RE) – an action to reevaluate or revise the 
whole basic policy 
After the formulation of dynamic adaptive policy is completed, the DAP 
proceeds from the designing phase to the implementation phase; the basic 
policy is implemented together with prior actions and the monitoring system. 
The adaptive process is suspended until a trigger value is reached and a 
responsive action is activated. In certain cases, the responsive actions may 
not be sufficient to support the basic policy and the basic policy need to be 
revised altogether. In such case, the experience and information gained from 
setting up the initial adaptive policy can be of valuable input to the subsequent 
process. 
In the next section, this DAP scheme is applied to develop an adaptive policy 
for implementing a MaaS-concept in the city of Nijmegen, the Netherlands. 
This application is a simplified example to illustrate the potential of DAP in this 
context 
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Figure 3: DAP process (Machau et al. 2017, adapted from Walker et al. 2013) 
The application of DAP has been explored in various fields, such as airport 
strategy planning (Kwakkel et al., 2008), Innovative urban transport solutions 
(Marchau et al., 2008), climate change (Rahman et al., 2008) and road pricing 
(Marchau et al., 2010).  
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4. CASE STUDY: NIJMEGEN CITY, THE NETHERLANDS 
4.1 Background 
Nijmegen is a city in the province of Gelderland, situated in the eastern region 
of the Netherlands. As of April 2017, the city has about 170,000 inhabitants. 
Nijmegen is also adjacent to the city of Arnhem (25 kilometres), which has 
about 150,000 inhabitants, as of 2017. The proximity between the two cities 
makes them often seen as twin cities.   
Nijmegen attracts a high amount of traffic, which is generated by its population 
and employment in the area. The major employers are academic institutions, 
hospitals, and industries. The daily incoming traffic consists of commuters, 
students, business people, hospital and city visitors. The outgoing traffic is 
also mainly employment and education commuters to the surrounding city and 
the western Dutch urban area in Randstad region (City of Nijmegen, 2016). 
 
Figure 4: Public transport network of Nijmegen (City of Nijmegen, 2016) 
Public transportation plays an essential part in the city’s transport system. The 
main railway (Nijmegen Station) provides intercity and regional connections 
between Nijmegen with destinations such as Amsterdam, Schiphol, and a 
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border town with Germany in Venlo. It facilitates approximately 45,000 
passengers on average daily. The city has four other stations, one of which 
serves the Heijendaal district that is largely occupied by Radboud University, 
Radboud UMC (academic hospital) and HAN University of Applied Sciences. 
Similar to other cities in the Netherlands, Nijmegen has a high proportion of 
cycling traffic, with over 24% of daily traffic. Nevertheless, private car has the 
highest trip proportion, with 41% (driver and passenger combined), whereas 
public transport accounts for 9% of all daily trips. This figure is slightly different 
if we consider only trips below 5 kilometres. Cycling trips become dominant 
(37%), follows by car trips (30%), and walking (28%). Public transport trips 
represent a meagre proportion of only 3-4%, although 88.7% of the city’s 
population was living within 300 metres from a public transport line in 2014-
2015 (City of Nijmegen, 2016).  
Nijmegen city is currently experiencing increased transport congestion during 
rush-hours. Long queues of car traffic can be regularly observed around the 
two bridges that link the city to its surrounding area to the north. Additionally, 
there are long queues of bus and train passengers for services between the 
central station and Heijendaal district during the peak hours period as well. 
Breng, the local bus operator, has commissioned an exclusive bus rapid 
transit service between the station and Heijendaal district to resolve the issue 
but the problem persists. These congestion problems are expected to 
intensify, as the residential area north of the city (De Waalsprong) is further 
developed, and the number of students enrolled at these institutions continues 
to increase. Also, the low percentage of bus patronage put a strain on the bus 
operator to maintain the profitability of the operation of its 35 bus lines. 
4.2 DAP for implementing MaaS in Nijmegen city 
In this section, the DAP framework is applied to resolving the transport 
problems of Nijmegen. The main aim here is to demonstrate how DAP can be 
used to formulate an implementation plan for a MaaS scheme. This DAP is 
neither exhaustive or finalised. It is simplified and based on a desktop study, 
and only a selection of items are included here. The information presents here 
should be seen as a simplified first draft of the DAP plan to initiate discussion 
with stakeholders, who will enhance the sophistication and relevance of the 
plan through a participatory process. 
Step I Setting the Stage 
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The current transport policy objectives of Nijmegen city are to maintain the 
levels of accessibility, reliability, and safety of its transport system from the 
perspectives of visitors, residents and economic vitality of the inner city. The 
objectives also focus on clean and sustainable transport, such as bicycle and 
public transport. Based on these objectives, the city aims to achieve: 1) 
Increase accessibility and flow, 2) Increase quality and quantity of parking 
facilities, 3) Increase road safety, 4) Stimulate participation public transport, 
and 5) Stimulate bicycle use (City of Nijmegen, 2017). 
There is a number of policy options to realising these objectives; such as 
improving the existing public transport service, introducing an innovative 
demand-responsive transport service, or implementing a MaaS scheme. 
MaaS can be a promising policy as its operationalise can improve the 
efficiency of the transport system through better matching between demand 
and supply. Additionally, the hyper-convenient transport service in MaaS is 
likely to increase public transport patronage. However, there are a number of 
uncertainties that currently obstruct the large-scale implementation of MaaS, 
such as users’ acceptance and the willingness of transport operators to 
support the implementation. The latter can be elaborated further into lack of 
trust, potential loss or control over their operation, and the need to adjust their 
business model (Finger et al., 2015; König, Eckhardt, Aapaoja, Sochor, & 
Karlsson, 2016; Lund, 2017). Additionally, the associated risks in the 
deployment of an innovative transport solution as MaaS are high. As 
mentioned above, MaaS is still in its early phase with a limited number of 
operational and pilot schemes.  
Step II Assembling a basic MaaS-policy 
A step forward is to start with implementing a demand-responsive shared-ride 
service, similar to Katsuplus or UberPool. This measure will allow actors 
involved to build up experience in operating this innovative transport service 
and gaining confidence from potential users and stakeholders. 
The solution put forward by the Province of Gelderland and Breng is Breng 
flex, a demand-oriented, shared-ride service operating in the Arnhem and 
Nijmegen region. Its operation began in December 2016 for a one-year 
period. The service provides an on-demand connection between a preferred, 
existing bus stop to another preferred, existing bus stop within the area for a 
fixed price of €3.50 per passenger. It operates 7-day a week (weekday 06.30-
24.00; Sat 08.00-24.00, and Sun 09.00-24.00) (Breng, 2017). The service 
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fleet consists of ten 7-seater buses, powered by eco-gas and eight electric 
cars. The bus has space for a wheelchair and baby carriages, which, if 
needed, can be indicated during the reservation. Users can order a ride via a 
smartphone app or by calling a dedicated phone number. Once a booking is 
made, the app informs the user about the driver, the type of vehicle, the 
license plate, the driver’s phone number, the estimated time of pick up, and 
the total journey time. Trip cancellation is possible free of charge for up to 2 
minutes after booking. After that, a 70% of the agreed fee will be charged with 
a maximum of €5.00. Payment can be made via electronic transfer via an app, 
iDeal (online transfer), credit card, debit card, or OV chip card (Dutch 
transport smart card), but cash payment is not accepted. The pilot is 
monitored and evaluated as part of the Smart Cities’ Responsive Intelligent 
Public Transport Systems (SCRIPTS) project. 
 
Figure 5: Breng Flex Source: left (Breng, 2017), right (author) 
The definitions of success for Breng flex are related to the objectives 
regarding the specification of desirable outcomes (e.g. desired levels of PT 
use, car-ownership, and congestion, emissions). Next, we identify four 
necessary conditions of success: a. Sufficient supports by stakeholders, such 
as public transport operator, b. Sufficient demand for and acceptance of the 
new service, c. Reliable technology to support operation, and d. Delivery 
Breng flex’s performance in according with general transport goals. 
Step III, IV and V (Increasing the robustness of the basic policy, defining 
a monitoring system, and specifying responsive actions) 
The immediate and future robustness of the basic policy is specified in these 
steps; a number of actions are put forward to improve the policy’s robustness, 
protecting it from failing or taking opportunities. A summary of is presented in 
Table 1. Columns 1-4 present some clear conditions for the success of the 
basic policy, its Vulnerabilities (V) and Opportunities (O), and if these 
vulnerabilities and opportunities are certain or uncertain. Column 5 contains 
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the actions to be implemented together with the implementation of the basic 
policy (t = 0) to increase the basic policy’s robustness. The signposts and their 
trigger levels, as part of the monitoring system, are shown in column 6, and 
the associated adaptive actions are specified in the final column. 
We will highlight some elements of the table to demonstrate the essence of 
the DAP scheme and its application to the case study. In the first row (a. 
Sufficient support by local authority operators and other stakeholders), the 
lack of interest to participate in actors and stakeholders may be certain, as the 
concept is innovative and unprecedented. This potential lack of support can 
derail the project. A possible Shaping Action (SH) to decrease this likelihood 
is to secure support from critical actors and actively involve and communicate 
with actors and stakeholders to ensure their understanding and ownership in 
the project. Additionally, a Mitigating Action (M) is to secure funding that can 
be used to subsidise the service, thus reducing the reluctance of public 
transport provider to join the project. The associated signposts will monitor the 
level of the corporation from each actor and stakeholder (e.g. highly engaged, 
not interested, and hostile). Should these levels drop below expectation, the 
adaptive actions will be triggered. These involved intensified stakeholder 
engagement (CA), reducing the scope of service to minimise impacts (DA), 
and reassessment of the basic policy (RE). 
In the next row, demand for and user’s acceptance of the new innovative 
service is one of the highly critical conditions to its success. It is an uncertain 
opportunity that hinges on multiple factors. A Shaping Action (SH) to increase 
the likelihood of high users’ demand is an effective marketing strategy that 
provides information and attracts users to the service. To capitalise this 
opportunity, we can prepare service extension plan, which increases fleet size 
or area of coverage. Also, the scope of the project can also be upgraded to 
implement a MaaS scheme by including a range of other modes of transport, 
such as bicycle sharing, car sharing, and public transport services. The 
signposts will monitor the number of users on the platform and actual service 
usage. These parameters will trigger adaptive actions; to implement 
expansion plan (CP) or in the event of the high level of demand and 
acceptance to reassess the plan and roll out a MaaS scheme (RE).  
As of August 2017, the actors involved in the Breng flex are highly satisfied 
with the preliminary outcomes. The mid-term evaluation is currently ongoing 
and will be finalised by the end of September. The municipality of Nijmegen 
has initiated a follow-up MaaS pilot project in SL!M Nijmegen. The project 
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aims to provide a door-to-door mobility service via a platform interface of a 
smartphone App and website. It is a collaboration between the local steering 
group of Heijendaal district, the representative of the public transport provider 
in Breng knowledge centre, and the local authority in the Province of 
Gelderland. The pilot is also part of the SCRIPTS project with an operation 
period between 20 August 2017 and 1 March 2018.  
SL!M’s primary target group is the visitors to the Heijendaal district, which is 
home to several academic and research institutions, such as Radboud 
University, Radboud UMC (academic hospital) and HAN University of Applied 
Sciences. Additionally, it aims to benefit the residents, as well as students and 
employers of these institutes. Users can plan, reserve, make payment, and 
access their multimodal trips by the platform, which is operated by GoAbout. 
The pilot will offer the following transport modes: 
 Bicycle sharing (SL!M Campusbike) – users can access a pool of 
shared bicycle using a smartphone to release a smart-lock at any time 
of the day.  
 Public transport – users can plan and buy ticket for their public 
transport trip via bus and train through their smartphone 
 Car sharing (SL!M Campuscar) – users can make reservations and 
access a pool of car sharing located on the campus using their 
smartphone. The additional cars will also be available for medium and 
long-term rental for business visit and weekend.  
 On-demand shared taxi (Breng Flex) – for a fixed fee, users can travel 
between their bus stops of choice within the service area of Arnhem 
and Nijmegen 
 Taxi – User can also reserve regular taxi service through the platform 
 Parking and Park & Ride services- The platform also able to identify 
parking availability around the desired destination.  
In parallel to the platform operation, the consortium will also create a physical 
focal point for transport service, in the form of mobility hub (SL!M Hubs) at 
different locations. At each of these hubs, facilities for different modes of 
transport, such as parking space, a pool of bike and car sharing, and public 
transport stop will be provided. Additionally, interactive screens for transport 
information and customer services will be provided. These hubs constitute 
points, which transfers between different modes within the transport system 
will occur. 
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Table 1: Vulnerabilities and opportunities in the basic policy to implement Breng flex 
Condition for 
Success 
Vulnerability (V) / 
Opportunity (O) 
Certain / 
Uncertain 
Actions taken at Time = 0 
(Increase Basic Policy 
Robustness) 
Signpost Monitoring (begins at 
Time = 0) and Trigger Events 
Actions taken at Time > 0 
(Adaptive Actions) 
a. Sufficient support 
by crucial actors, 
such as public 
transport operator, 
and stakeholders, 
such as taxi 
operator. 
V Lack of willingness to 
collaborate due to lack of 
trust, efforts required to 
adjust services, or 
potential loss of operation 
control. 
Strong opposition from 
competing services, such 
as taxi. 
C (SH) Lobby supports from 
critical actors and actively 
involve relevant stakeholders 
and competitor from the design 
phase to ensure service 
acceptability and support  
(M) Secure funding to subsidise 
service. 
Monitor: Level of Stakeholders’ 
interest and corporation, feedback 
and comments 
Trigger: Level of participation drop 
below expected 
(CA) Intensify and actively 
engaged stakeholders to 
reduce conflict 
(DA) Reduce scope of service 
to necessary minimal 
(RE) If support is in sufficient 
reassess basic policy 
b. Demand for and 
acceptance of the 
new service 
continues to grow 
O Demand and user 
acceptance of Breng flex 
increases at a faster rate 
than expected 
U (SH) Formulate effective 
marketing and promotion 
strategy to ensure exposure 
and user awareness about the 
service; 
(EZ) Prepare expansion plan 
for Breng flex service. Prepare 
implementation plan for MaaS  
Monitor: Number of user on the 
platform (potential users) and 
service usage (active users) 
Trigger: Number of potential and 
active user rise above threshold  
(CP) Implement Breng flex 
expansion, increase fleet size 
by purchase new vehicle or 
includes taxis 
(RE) Readjust the service 
strategy and roll out MaaS 
service by include other 
modes of transport 
c. Reliable 
technology to 
support operation  
V Technology failure  U (SH) Deploy proven technology 
with high-level of technical 
support. Soft launch the system 
to iron out any possible bug,  
(H) Prepare non-digital 
contingency plans, such as call 
centre and manual vehicle 
management strategy 
Monitoring: Operations report, 
Customer feedback; system 
operation status  
Trigger: Level of negative 
feedback and failure incident rise 
above thresholds 
(CA) Conduct investigation 
and resolve issues 
(DA) Roll back to operate as 
DRT (non-digitalisation) 
 
d. Delivery Breng 
flex’s performance in 
according with 
general transport 
goals 
V Breng flex’s performance 
below expected service 
quality 
U (SH) Understand the potential 
of Breng flex. Set realistic 
targets with a clear scope.  
(H) Manage expectations of 
stakeholders 
Monitoring: Stakeholder and 
customer feedbacks; service 
performance in various aspects 
(e.g. efficiency, satisfaction, 
environment) 
Trigger: Levels of performance fall 
below thresholds 
(CA) Adjust service design 
and implement measures to 
increase quality and level of 
service 
(DA) Readjust expectation of 
stakeholders  
(RE) Reassess system design 
Note: (H) = Hedging Action; (M) = Mitigating Action; (Ez) = Exploiting Action; (SH) = Shaping Action; (SZ) = Seizing Action; (CA) = Corrective Action; (DA) = Defensive Action; 
(CP) = Capitalizing Action; (RE) = Reassessment 
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5. CONCLUSION / DISCUSSION 
In this paper, we applied Dynamic Adaptive Planning (DAP) which focuses on 
addressing opportunities and vulnerabilities of implementing an initial MaaS-
system for the city of Nijmegen. According to the DAP-scheme, we start with 
the implementation of a Breng flex system, a demand responsive taxi-bus 
service that aimed to replace current inefficient bus lines. The necessary 
conditions for success for this basic policy include sufficient support from local 
public transport providers and other stakeholders, the acceptance of the new 
transport service by the city’s residents, a reliable technology for reservation 
and dynamic routing/scheduling is available, and the performance of the 
service in according with general transport goals. We then propose certain 
actions that should be taken right away to increase the robustness of the 
basic MaaS policy:  
 secure support from critical actor and actively collaborate with 
stakeholders, such as public transport providers, governments, and 
citizen institutes (Shaping Action),  
 develop an expansion plan in case demand increases faster than 
expected (Exploiting Action),  
 soft launching of the system enabling the handling of any possible bug 
before official launch (Hedging Action). 
Also, a monitoring system is specified to trigger future adaptations of the basic 
policy as additional knowledge, such as acceptance and performance of 
Breng flex, emerge. For example, the stakeholders’ levels of acceptance or, 
the level of ridership, and cost-revenue ratio are monitored, and responsive 
actions are prepared to be implemented in case trigger-events occur. For 
example, a high level of acceptance by travellers may prompt a roll out of a 
MaaS scheme as a Capitalizing Action. 
As of August 2017, the preliminary results of the Breng flex project indicate 
the project is a success. The formal evaluation process is ongoing and will be 
concluded by the end of September. The city of Nijmegen has initiated a 
MaaS pilot project together with some actors. The scheme will start its 
operation from 20 August 2017 to 1 March 2018. 
We demonstrate in this paper how DAP can offer an alternative transport 
planning method, which is contrary to traditional approaches, as DAP 
addresses uncertainty explicitly and incorporates adaptation as part of the 
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process. This method assumes uncertainty is nonbinary and 
inevitable. It enhances the robustness of a given plan, amid surrounding 
dynamic changes, thus increasing the likelihood of its success. 
There are however also challenges in applying adaptive planning approach in 
practice(Bosomworth et al., 2017)  These challenges include difficulties in 
using DAP to deal with complex and contested issues, establish trigger points 
for a complex system, and to take into account the institutional and 
governance implications of applying DAP. Filling in these challenges can 
improve DAP, which to-date has been applied mostly by researchers in 
hypothetical case studies. 
The shortfalls of DAP reported above highlight improvements needed to 
ensure its successful application in the real world. The simplified DAP scheme 
presented in this paper is a result of a desktop study. It should be seen as a 
starter for developing a MaaS-DAP with actors and stakeholders, rather than 
an implementation-ready plan. The development of such participatory MaaS-
DAP will be done in future research.  
  
  
   
 
 
 
© AET 2017 and contributors 
20 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
ADB. (2009). Changing Course - A NEW Paradigm for Sustainable Urban 
Transport. Image (Rochester, N.Y.) (Vol. 2010). 2008. Retrieved from 
http://sti-india-uttoolkit.adb.org/mod4/se5/006_2.html 
ATKINS. (2015). Journeys of the Future. London. Retrieved from 
http://www.atkinsglobal.com/~/media/Files/A/Atkins-Corporate/uk-and-
europe/uk-thought-leadership/reports/Journeys of the future_300315.pdf 
Baliga, A., Chen, X., Coskun, B., de los Reyes, G., Lee, S., Mathur, S., & Van 
der Merwe, J. E. (2011). VPMN – Virtual Private Mobile Network Towards 
Mobility-as-a-Service Arati. In Proceedings of the second international 
workshop on Mobile cloud computing and services - MCS ’11 (p. 7). 
http://doi.org/10.1145/1999732.1999735 
Bosomworth, K., Leith, P., Harwood, A., & Wallis, P. J. (2017). What’s the 
problem in adaptation pathways planning? The potential of a diagnostic 
problem-structuring approach. Environmental Science and Policy, 
76(January), 23–28. http://doi.org/10.1016/j.envsci.2017.06.007 
Breng. (2017). Breng flex. Retrieved August 11, 2017, from 
https://www.breng.nl/breng-flex/1411 
City of Nijmegen. (2016). Application for European Green Capital. City of 
Nijmegen. 
City of Nijmegen. (2017). Mobility objectives of Nijmegen city. 
CIVITAS. (2016). Mobility-as-a-Service: A new transport model. Civitas 
Insight, 18, August. Retrieved from http://civitas.eu/content/civitas-insight-
18-mobility-service-new-transport-model 
Comtrade. (2017). The evolution of mobility services - from a substitute player 
to a game changer. Retrieved from http://comtradedigital.com/wp-
content/uploads/2016/09/Evolution-of-Mobility-Services-white-paper.pdf 
Courtney, H. (2001). 20/20 Foresight: Crafting Strategy in an Uncertain World 
(Hardcover). In Harvard Business School Press Books (p. 1). 
http://doi.org/10.1016/S0169-2070(03)00033-5 
Edwards, T., & Smith, S. (2008). Transport Problems Facing Large Cities. 
NSW Parliamentary Library Briefing Paper, (6). 
European Comission. (2016). Horizon 2020 - Smart, Green and Integrated 
transport. Imporant Notice on the Scond Horizon 2020 Work Programme, 
2017(July 2016), 129. 
  
   
 
 
 
© AET 2017 and contributors 
21 
Finger, M., Bert, N., & Kupfer, D. (2015). Mobility-as-a-Service: from 
the Helsinki experiment to a European model? FSR Transport, 1(2015). 
http://doi.org/10.2870/07981 
Giesecke, R., Surakka, T., & Hakonen, M. (2016). Conceptualising Mobility as 
a Service. 2016 11th International Conference on Ecological Vehicles and 
Renewable Energies, EVER 2016, (2536), 1–9. 
http://doi.org/10.1109/EVER.2016.7476443 
Hayashi, Y., Doi, K., Yagishita, M., & Kuwata, M. (2004). Urban transport 
sustainability: Asian trends, problems and policy practices. … Journal of 
Transport and …. Retrieved from 
http://www.ejtir.tudelft.nl/issues/2004_01/pdf/2004_01_02.pdf 
Hietanen, S. (2014). “ Mobility as a Service ” – the new transport model ? 
Eurotransport, 12(2), 2–4. 
Holmberg, P.-E., Collado, M., Sarasini, S., & Williander, M. (2015). Mobility as 
a Service: Describing the Framework, 1–54. 
IET. (2010). Rebound - Unintended consequences from transport policies and 
technology innovations. 
Jittrapirom, P., Caiati, V., Feneri, A. M., Alonso-González, M. J., 
Ebrahimigharehbaghi, S., & Narayan, J. (2017). Mobility as a Service : a 
critical review of definitions, assessments of schemes, and key 
challenges. Urban Planning, 2(2). 
Jittrapirom, P., Knoflacher, H., & Mailer, M. (2017). The conundrum of the 
motorcycle in the mix of sustainable urban transport. Transportation 
Research Procedia, 25, 4873–4894. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/j.trpro.2017.05.365 
Karlsson, M., Sochor, J., Aapaoja, A., Eckhardt, J., & König, D. (2017). 
Deliverable 4: Impact Assessment. MAASiFiE project funded by CEDR., 
(4). Retrieved from 
http://www.vtt.fi/sites/maasifie/PublishingImages/results/CEDR_Mobility_
MAASIFIE_Deliverable_4_Revised_Final.pdf 
Kölbl, R., Niegl, M., & Knoflacher, H. (2008). A strategic planning 
methodology. Transport Policy, 15(5), 273–282. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/j.tranpol.2008.07.001 
König, D., Eckhardt, J., Aapaoja, A., Sochor, J., & Karlsson, M. (2016). 
Business and operator models for Mobility as a Service (MaaS) 
(Deliverable 3 to the MAASiFiE project). 
  
   
 
 
 
© AET 2017 and contributors 
22 
Kwakkel, J. H., Walker, W. E., & Marchau, V. A. W. J. (2008). 
Adaptive policymaking for airport strategic planning. In 2008 1st 
International Conference on Infrastructure Systems and Services: 
Building Networks for a Brighter Future, INFRA 2008. 
http://doi.org/10.1109/INFRA.2008.5439665 
Lund, E. (2017). Drivers and Barriers for Integrated Mobility Services Drivers 
and Barriers for Integrated Mobility Services, (May). 
http://doi.org/10.13140/RG.2.2.14619.26403 
MaaS Alliance. (2017). Mobility as a Service Alliance. Retrieved August 11, 
2017, from https://maas-alliance.eu/ 
Marchau, V. A. W. J., Walker, W. E., & van Wee, G. P. (2010). Dynamic 
adaptive transport policies for handling deep uncertainty. Technological 
Forecasting and Social Change, 77(6), 940–950. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/j.techfore.2010.04.006 
Marchau, V., Walker, W., & van Duin, R. (2008). An adaptive approach to 
implementing innovative urban transport solutions. Transport Policy, 
15(6), 405–412. http://doi.org/10.1016/j.tranpol.2008.12.002 
May, A. D. (2003). Prospects: A Decision Makers’ Guidebook. Brussels: 
European Commission. Retrieved from http://www.iee-library.eu/. 
Meurs, H., & Timmermans, H. (2016). Mobility as a Service as a Multi-Sided 
Market : Challenges for Modeling. TRB 2016 Annual Meeting. 
Mulley, C. (2017). Mobility as a Services ( MaaS ) – does it have critical 
mass ?, 1647(May). http://doi.org/10.1080/01441647.2017.1280932 
Nemtanu, F., Schlingensiepen, J., Buretea, D., & Iordache, V. (2016). Mobility 
as a service in smart cities. In A. Zbuchea & D. Nikolaidis (Eds.), 
Responsible entrepreneurship - vision, development and ethics: 
Proceedings of the 9th International conference for entrepreneurship, 
innovation and regional development. June 23-24, 2016 Bucharest, 
Romania (2016th ed., pp. 425–435). Bucharest, Romania: 
Comunicare.ro. 
Rahman, A., Walker, W. E., & Marchau, V. (2008). Coping with Uncertainties 
About Climate Change in Infrastructure Planning – An Adaptive 
Policymaking Approach, (November), 1–57. 
Sochor, J., Strömberg, H., & Karlsson, M. (2015). CHALLENGES IN 
INTEGRATING USER, COMMERCIAL, AND SOCIETAL 
PERSPECTIVES IN AN INNOVATIVE MOBILITY SERVICE. In 94th 
Annual Meeting of the Transportation Research Board,. Washington, 
D.C.,. 
  
   
 
 
 
© AET 2017 and contributors 
23 
Taipale, Kaarin. Fellini, Claire. Le Blanc, D. (2012). Challenges and 
way forward in the urban sector. Sustainable Development in the 21st 
Century (SD21). 
travelspirit. (2017). Open or Closed? The Lancet. 
TSSG. (2017). THE FUTURE OF MOBILITY AS A SERVICE (MaaS):A CASE 
FOR EU AND IRISH RESEARCH. 
Walker, W. E. (2000). Policy analysis: a systematic approach to supporting 
policymaking in the public sector. Journal of Multi-Criteria Decision 
Analysis, 9(1–3), 11–27. http://doi.org/10.1002/1099-
1360(200001/05)9:1/3<11::AID-MCDA264>3.0.CO;2-3 
Walker, W. E., & Marchau, V. A. W. J. (2017). Dynamic adaptive policymaking 
for the sustainable city: The case of automated taxis. International 
Journal of Transportation Science and Technology. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijtst.2017.03.004 
Walker, W. E., Marchau, V. A. W. J., & Kwakkel, J. H. (2013). Uncertainty in 
the Framework of Policy Analysis. In W. A. H. Thissen & W. E. Walker 
(Eds.), Public Policy Analysis: New Developments (pp. 215–261). Boston, 
MA: Springer US. http://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-4602-6_9 
Walker, W. E., Marchau, V. A. W. J., & Swanson, D. (2010). Addressing deep 
uncertainty using adaptive policies: Introduction to section 2. 
Technological Forecasting and Social Change, 77(6), 917–923. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/j.techfore.2010.04.004 
Walker, W. E., Rahman, S. A., & Cave, J. (2001). Adaptive policies, policy 
analysis, and policy-making. European Journal of Operational Research, 
128(2), 282–289. http://doi.org/10.1016/S0377-2217(00)00071-0 
Xerox. (2015). The new mobility paradigm. 
Zavitsas, K., Kaparias, I., Bell, M., & Tomassini, M. (2010). Transport 
problems in cities. ISIS, (1). Retrieved from http://www.transport-
research.info/sites/default/files/project/documents/20120402_173932_45
110_D 1.1 - Transport problems in cities - v3.pdf 
 
